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INTRODUCTION
Technology is so much more than a prosthetic. But how much
more? And what else is it? In the legal realm, its role is not yet
clear. Such a lack of elucidation becomes problematic, especially
when technology has the ability to convert assumptions into facts,
and it takes on a truth-making, rather than a mere truth-revealing
mission. This Article argues that it is problematic to enable technology to stand in for reflective thinking, and calls attention to the
fact that evidentiary rules enable technology to decide what can be
proven, ergo what truth is.
Technology is a fork in the road of the legal meaning making process. It may simultaneously obscure and reveal legal truth. Given
this position in the process of negotiating the appearance of legal
truth, this Article discusses technology from a determinist and phenomenological perspective, directing the readers gaze to what constitutes legal truth. Then, it guides it to a brief discussion of the
role of technology within the evidentiary context of DNA sample
testing,2 to embrace the view of technology as mediator of truth,
closer to its Greek origins as techné: bringing-forth the truth, and
similar to the poiésis of the fine arts.3
I.
A)

TECHNOLOGY  A PHILOSOPHICAL AND JURISPRUDENTIAL
APPROACH
Greek Epistemic and Ontological Roots

All Western philosophical thought lives on the basis of its Greek
beginning, as a way to investigate reality through reason or reflective thinking.4 Greek roots are also evident when thinking about
technology linguistically and philosophically, ontologically. Etymologically, technology comes from the root techné.5
2. See 18 U.S.C. § 3600 (requiring courts to use DNA testing in certain cases where
defendants have been sentenced to imprisonment or death).
3. See Mark Blitz, Understanding Heidegger on Technology, 41 NEW ATLANTIS 63, 76
(2014).
4. BERTRAND RUSSELL, A HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY 1115 (1945).
5. See generally DAVID ROOCHNIK, OF ART AND WISDOM: PLATOS UNDERSTANDING OF
TECHNE (1996). David Roochnik comprehensively analyzes the Greek word techné, typically
translated as art, but also as craft, skill, expertise, technical knowledge, and even
science. Id. Roochnik maintains that Plato spoke of both the goodness of techné, as well
as its severe limitations and consequent need to be supplemented by nontechnical wisdom.
Id.
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Ontologically, techné made its first appearance as the earliest
form of instruction offered by Greek rhetoricians. The early sophists used techné as synonymous to art or skill, when describing their
knowledge-purveying activity.6 Protagoras, an early sophist, as imagined by Plato in the dialogue with the same title,7 described his
instruction as techné.8
In the same dialogue, Plato introduces a major conceptual development of craft, art, or techné, as a practical skill which does not
need to be mechanical. The knowledge and technique of using fire,
under the umbrella of techné, is the beginning of humanity in its
most simple and complex possibility. This is also the beginning of
techné as a type of experience, similar to what we would call today
know-how9:
Prometheus was at his wits end to find a means of preservation for mankind, so he stole from Hephaestus and
Athena their technical skill along with the use of firefor
it was impossible for anyone to acquire or make use of that
skill without fireand that was what he gave to man.
That is how man acquired his practical skill . . . .10
Plato also uses techné in his dialogue, Phaedrus,11 where he suggests that the ability to adapt arguments to various types of people
is central to a true art or techné of rhetoric.12 The speaker must
discover the kind of speech that matches each type of nature,13 to
be effective and impart knowledge or, perhaps, rumors. With Plato,
techné evolved from a skill to truth-making.
Platos bifurcation of techné into the true and the sham reaches a
new level of development (or confusion) with Aristotles
6. JAMES A. HERRICK, THE HISTORY AND THEORY OF RHETORIC: AN INTRODUCTION 59
(4th ed. 2009).
7. RUSSELL, supra note 4, at 8087.
8. PLATO, PROTAGORAS 1416 (C.C.W. Taylor ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1996) (399380
B.C.E.). For Plato instruction has a technical side, which can be professional or not. You
didnt learn any of those things in a technical way, with a view to becoming a professional
yourself, but simply for their educational value, as an amateur and a gentleman should. Id.
at 7.
9. For example, in Van Products Co. v. General Welding & Fabricating Co., the Pennsylvania Supreme Court defined know-how to include trade secrets. 213 A.2d 769, 777 (Pa.
1965). The concept of know-how is . . . a very fuzzily defined area, used primarily as a
short-hand device for stating the conclusion that a process is protectible. It covers a multitude of matters, however, which in the broad sense are not protectible, e.g., an employees
general knowledge and skill. Id.
10. PROTAGORAS, supra note 8, at 18 (emphasis added).
11. PLATO, PHAEDRUS (Benjamin Jowett trans., Mass. Inst. Tech.) (360 B.C.E.),
http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/phaedrus.html.
12. HERRICK, supra note 6, at 71.
13. Id.
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classification of art. For Aristotle, art covered the domain of productive knowledge, which creates both beautiful and useful objects.14
Thus, with Aristotle, techné becomes a model of
knowledge.15 Aristotles Rhetoric is considered an example of a complete techné, or art of rhetoric.16 Moreover, Aristotle links techné
with knowledge production (epistémé) in Book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics,17 finding that knowledge needs techné to be imparted: Again, every science is thought to be capable of being
taught, and its object of being learned.18
Nevertheless, they are different activities. From skill, through
know-how and knowledge production, techné begins its ascent into
the mechanical, or instrumentum. According to the Oxford English
Dictionary, instrumentum is an object, device, or apparatus designed or used for a particular purpose or task.19 The following
sections discuss technology framing and negotiating knowledge,
producing legal truth, and the societal challenges associated with
each of these roles.
B)

A Determinist View of Technology as a Human Extension

Ontologically, combining Platos view of technéas both skill and
knowledge, such as writing, which records knowledge and creates
it in the process20with Aristotles, technology ends up as a hydra
with multiple heads. Technology, with its roots in techné is an instrument of knowledge, its medium. Sometimes, like an understudy, techné can stand in for thinking because it records it. This
14. See Christopher Shields, Artistotle, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle/ (last updated Aug. 25, 2020) (providing background information on
Artistotles Rhetoric); see also HERRICK, supra note 6, at 79 ([R]hetoric and dialectic . . .
represent two complimentary arts of reasoning to probable conclusions . . . .).
15. See JANET M. ATWILL, RHETORIC RECLAIMED: ARISTOTLE AND THE LIBERAL ARTS
TRADITION 16263 (1998).
16. See SHARON CROWLEY & DEBRA HAWHEE, ANCIENT RHETORICS FOR CONTEMPORARY
STUDENTS 8990 (5th ed. 2012). Isocrates, Aristotles contemporary, also referred to his instruction as a logon techne, or art of discourse. Id. at 21. See also HERRICK, supra note 6, at
4649.
17. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. IV (W.D. Ross, trans., Mass. Inst. Tech.)
(350 B.C.), http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/nicomachaen.6.vi.html; see also ERIC
SCHATZBERG, TECHNOLOGY: CRITICAL HISTORY OF A CONCEPT 20 (2018).
18. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. IV (W.D. Ross, trans., Mass. Inst. Tech.)
(350 B.C.), http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/nicomachaen.6.vi.html.
19. Instrumentum, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2017). This entry has been updated (OED Third Edition, March 2017; most recently modified version published online December 2021).
20. [Socrates:] [W]ho should leave in writing or receive in writing any art under the
idea that the written word would be intelligible or certain; or who deemed that writing
was at all better than knowledge and recollection of the same matters?
PHAEDRUS, supra note 11.
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is why the philosophical roots of both the determinist approach to
technology as an infallible recording instrument, and those of the
phenomenological view of technology as intermediating experiential thinking spring from its Greek, techné, roots.
Nevertheless, as argued in this Article, in the legal realm, it appears that the determinist view of technology has influenced its legal use to a larger degree. A welcome extension of human capabilities and never a hindrance, technology has become a welcome prosthetic in the service of law, of the factfinder.21 Results that otherwise would not have been imaginable, not only are now achievable
but are unquestionably accepted, just because they are technologyinduced.
Scanning devices, for example, opened the door to law enforcement officers to gather information unreachable to them because of
location. Thirty years ago, using an Agema Thermovision 210 thermal imager, from the passenger seat of a passing vehicle, special
agents thermally scanned Danny Kyllos home temperature.22 The
temperature results obtained from the scanner were never questioned in court, partly due to this determinist approach to technology, which unquestionably views it from a positive angle.23 Only
the method of obtaining the temperature was questioned in court,
not the reliability of the temperature itself:
Where, as here, the Government uses a device that is not
in general public use, to explore details of the home that
would previously have been unknowable without physical
intrusion, the surveillance is a search and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant.24
However, had anyone raised the issue of the role of technology as
a legal truth producer, it might have opened the door to a richer

21. See discussion infra Part II.
22. Sean D. Thueson, Fourth Amendment SearchFuzzy Shades of Gray: The New
Bright-Line Rule in Determining When the Use of Technology Constitutes a Search, 2 WYO.
L. REV. 169, 16970 (2002) (citations omitted). In the Kyllo case, the defendant was suspected of growing marijuana in his home. Detectives used a thermal imager to scan his home
from a police vehicle while parked on a public street. Thermal imagers passively record infrared information to indicate relative temperature, a phenomenon which cannot be readily
observed without the aid of such a device. Id. (citations omitted); see also Kyllo v. United
States, 533 U.S. 27, 2931 (2001). Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia invalidated the
legal value of the truth finding result, as obtained against constitutional protections against
unwarranted search and seizure. Id. at 40.
23. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 2931.
24. Id. at 40.
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discussion about what constitutes legal truth.25 Perhaps the process of marijuana decriminalization would have started in earnest
thirty years ago,26 if technology was not regarded monolithically as
a factfinder prosthetic, but as a tool to negotiate social meaning:
what was the social meaning of high temperature coming from the
garage of the owner of a Floridian triplex? Is it criminal? Does it
have to be criminal? Are there any other possible explanations?
This positive view of technology as a welcome prosthetic impacts
both its use and how it influences different practices and settings.
This conceptualization of technology creates a dogmatic trust in accepting its results without any questions. Technologically-produced
results are taken for granted, as positive and truth enabling in any
set of circumstances any time technology is used, at the expense of
any reflexive thinking about what exactly technology is, what is
produced or used, and to what consequences.
Without reflection and introspection, it is often forgotten that all
evidence, direct or circumstantial, is equally problematic.27 Ironically, evidence produced by technological advancements receives
less introspective evaluation, though it is often circumstantial.28
Direct testimony from a witness to the events under investigation
would never be perceived as more probative than circumstantial evidence obtained from technology. The reverse, however, has become
inevitable, as technologically produced evidence holds more probative value.29 Think only about a witness visiting the Kyllos and testifying afterward that the temperature inside felt normal to rebut
evidence obtained through that new method or technology that it
was much higher than normal. Uncontestably, a thermometer is
more reliable telling temperature than a human experiencing it and
recording: I feel hot or I feel cold. Similarly, the infrared technology is even more advanced than a thermometer to read temperatures, but neither reading is infallible because a mere mechanical recording of temperatures does not tell the entire story. For
25. Or it might have even started the conversation about how one decides to transform a
garage into a commercial solarium to grow marijuana plants at the risk of many years of
incarceration. See id. at 2930 (describing facts related to Danny Kyllos life).
26. See Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Cannabis Capitalism, 69 BUFF. L. REV. 215, 216 (2021). The
last 25 years have witnessed a revolutionary change in the status of cannabis under American law. Before 1996, state and federal law uniformly outlawed its distribution. By contrast,
today 36 states allow marijuana to be sold for its potential medical use and 15 (along with
the District of Columbia) also permit its recreational use. Id.
27. As far as jury instructions are concerned, the law makes no distinction between direct
and circumstantial evidence. Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 140 (1954); 26 MOORES
FEDERAL PRACTICECRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 630.32 (2021).
28. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
29. This is the case with DNA testing. See 18 U.S.C. § 3600(a)(3).
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instance, thermometers can also be faulty, broken, or the temperature recorded does not tell the truth. Holding a thermometer near
a burning oven might indicate that the temperature inside that
dwelling is high, but without direct testimony that mere recording,
while true, would confuse the fact finder in a case similar to Kyllo.
Philosophically and then scientifically, knowledge and technology have never been meant to overlap. As shown earlier in this
Article, they did not overlap for Plato, nor for Aristotle. But, somehow, the instrumental view of technology evolved into dogmatic determinism. Maybe this happened because of the undemocratic roots
of philosophyreflective thinking taught to the young, well-off
Athenian (male30) citizens, was not a widespread human activity,
given its rarefied circles. By association, technology, especially as
skills intermediating knowledge, slipped rather easily into the role
of a welcome replacement to knowledge produced through reflective
thinking. Given this expedient transition, technology has benefitted from a determinist, unquestionably positive view. But expedience comes with a high societal price: a less knowledgeable, inquisitive, democratic society. Knowledge relies on technology as a modality of engaging the thinking process, guiding and finalizing it, as
shown below. Technology predisposes knowledge building. Especially in law, where truth is not metaphysical, a matter of how
things are,31 but how they are shown and perceived. When technology determines appearance, it also determines judicial outcomes. A
more nuanced role of technology might deepen our democratic principles of an open society.
C)

A Phenomenological View of Technology as Historical and Experiential

Phenomenology can be described as the study of a phenomenon,
or appearance.32 It does not mean that phenomenology deals with
mere appearance as opposed to reality, with a mental image instead of persistent thing.33
A very succinct definition of
30. This Article cannot comment on more than the gender of Athenians. They were Europeans, yes, but commenting on the whiteness of Athenians, for instance, would be anachronistic because Athenians did not recognize themselves as white and did not base their
democracy on whitenessmaleness and property ownership were the only requirements
for public service in Athens, but not whiteness.
31. But see Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa & Matthias Steup, The Analysis of Knowledge,
STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-analysis/ (last updated Mar. 7, 2017) (suggesting that real truth is, in fact, a matter of how things are, while
this Article posits that legal truth is the opposite).
32. CHAD ENGELLAND, PHENOMENOLOGY 2 (2020).
33. Id. (emphasis in original).
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phenomenology as used here is the study of experience, as it unfolds, which allows participants to sort out both mere appearances
from true appearance of things, and legal truth from mere truth.
Unlike determinism whose view of technology places it on a pedestal, phenomenology encourages a relational approach to meaningmaking.34 Emphasizing the experiential interaction between humans, technology, and the world,35 phenomenology would correct
the intimidating view of reflective thinking and thus the wrongful
embrace of technology. Through phenomenology, technology opens
the ways to experience the world, which inevitably produces reflection upon that experience, which subsequently is incorporated in
meaning-making.
Law relishes appearances (legal appearances36) as much as reality. Legal truth is a construct, evidentiarily established, and incorporating technological results. A determinist approach to technology reduces the factfinders role because it minimizes the role of reflective, investigative thinking. To the contrary, a phenomenological view of technology exposes legal meaning as connected not to
the essence of things, but to human behavior. It exposes how technology interposes a layer of appearance, which might be exactly
what the factfinder needs, but understanding the difference keeps
the process open to improvements, which is inevitable.
The foremost phenomenological thinkers are Edmund Husserl
and Martin Heidegger.37 Their work is briefly discussed here to the
34. See generally DANA NEACŞU, THE BOURGEOIS CHARM OF KARL MARX AND THE
IDEOLOGICAL IRONY OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE (2020) (highlighting Professor Neacşus
view on meaning making).
35. There are many approaches to phenomenology, including G.W.F. HEGEL,
PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT (A.V. Miller trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1952) (1807). Hegels
main purpose was to unfold human history as a process of human consciousness. Id.
Heidegger and Husserl (discussed here) continue Hegels transcendental approach to phenomenology, because both have an idealist subjectivist approach to the philosophyas a reasonable investigation of the worldrather than a materialist approach, as I do. While a
phenomenologist, because truth is revealed legally through experience, I believe, in Marx
and Engels words that the first premise of all human existence and, therefore, of all history,
the premise, namely, that men must be in a position to live in order to be able to make
history. KARL MARX & FRIEDRICH ENGELS, THE GERMAN IDEOLOGY 47 (Prometheus Books
1998) (1845). Furthermore, I doubt that only someone who had been exposed to music enjoys
music as such and not as noise, but even more interestingly, for me, isnt all music noise, and
therefore what creates music is the pleasure it produces in the listener?
36. See, e.g., Adam M. Samaha, Regulation for the Sake of Appearance, 125 HARV. L. REV.
1563, 1565 (2012) (appearance matters in law); see also Dana Neacşu, Cazul Aparenței ca
Normativitate Transformativă. Exemple din Dreptul American [The Case of Legal Appearance as a Transformative Norm. Examples from American Law], in 2 IN HONOREM FLAVIUS
ANTONIU BAIAS  APARENTA ÎN DREPT 279 (Adriana Almasan et al. eds., Hamangiu ed. 2021).
37. Certainly, more knowledgeable scholars would add other philosophers, and for their
views. See generally CHRISTOPHER MACANN, FOUR PHENOMENOLOGICAL PHILOSOPHERS:
HUSSERL, HEIDEGGER, SARTRE, MERLEAU-PONTY (1993). This Article limits itself to Husserl
and Heidegger because of their view of historical and experiential truth (particularly for
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extent that their theories are helpful to this Articles call for a jurisprudential role of technology as intermediating legal truth to the
semiotic agent, the factfinder.
1.

Husserls Experiential View of Truth38

In 1929, Edmund Husserls phenomenological theory became experiential and constitutive.39 [I]deal formations [are] essentially
products of the correlative structures of productive cognitive
life[.]40 Husserls phenomenologicalphilosophical project on the
problem of the constitution of meaning focused on exploring the processes through which things (ranging from directly intuitable
physical bodies to abstract mathematical objects) attain their
meaning for the human mind.41
According to Irish philosopher Dermot Moran, Chair in Catholic
Philosophy at Boston College, Husserl apparently had his breakthrough phenomenological revelation in 1898 when he realized that
meaning was the result of a universal a priori of correlation between experienced object and manners of givenness.42 Every object
must be thus understood not solely as it is in itself, but in relation
to the subjective acts which disclose it. For instance, the truth revealed through evidence is the result of multiple evidentiary correlations that made possible its realization, or using Husserls vocabulary, its givenness.43 Meaning, and thus truth, for Husserl, is
the result of a process of consolidation, sedimentation, and
Husserl) and their anti-determinist view of technology. See LAMBERT ZUIDERVAART, TRUTH
IN HUSSERL, HEIDEGGER, AND THE FRANKFURT SCHOOL: CRITICAL RETRIEVAL 19, 20 (2017).
38. ZUIDERVAART, supra note 37, at 20.
Husserls explication of propositional truth makes possible a deliberate [schrittweise]
and critically testable [kontrollierbare] expansion toward existential truth, toward
truth as it is lived in true friendships and truthful conduct, for example, and not simply
as it is asserted. Even though Husserl does not really account for the relationships
among truth, history, and human practices (Praxis), for the first time since German
idealism Husserl understands human life in its entirety as oriented to truth, and he
regards philosophy as the radicalization of this relation to truth [Wahrheitsbezug].
Id.
39. This processual, meaning-making aspect is more interesting than Husserls ahistorical view of human existence, and the transcendental, intuitive basis of thinking. For more
on Husserl, see ZUIDERVAART, supra note 37.
40. EDMUND HUSSERL FORMAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC 263 (Dorion Cairns trans.,
Springer Sci. & Bus. Media 1969) (1929).
41. Peter Woelert, Husserl on Symbolic Technologies and Meaning-Constitution: A Critical Inquiry, 50 CONTL PHIL. REV. 289, 29697 (2017). Husserl further developed his own
phenomenological concept of intentionality. Id. at 297. According to it, individual consciousness, in its various cognitive and affective manifestations, is and remains phenomenologically always and essentially consciousness of something. Id. (emphasis omitted).
42. DERMOT MORAN, HUSSERLS CRISIS OF THE EUROPEAN SCIENCES AND
TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY: AN INTRODUCTION 21 (2012).
43. Id at 1521.
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stratification. Moreover, the constitution of meaning relies on temporal experiences in consciousness; humans function as semiotic
agents.44
Furthermore, Husserl focuses on linguistically mediated processes of consolidation of meanings which are progressively superimposed upon by persisting linguistic acquisitions.45 Specifically,
a particular emphasis is placed on the form of sedimentation that
occurs with and while using the medium of writing.
Husserl observes that writing is peculiar as a linguistic
medium because it allows for the sensible embodiment of
meanings through a generalized system of signs . . . .46
[S]igns are sensibly experienceable47 by ones visual
senses, and are importantly of such a disposition that they
are potentially intersubjectively experienceable in common.48
According to Husserl, there are several implications stemming
from these features of writing. The manifest stabilization of meaning depends on the levels its carriers (i.e., the material, written
signs) stimulate. This is an efficient process of stratification and
consolidation of once actively constituted meanings, and accordingly, truth, viewed as a historical stratification of human practices.49
From this perspective, the written text enables the process of sedimentation of meaning, not its intelligibility (as Platos Socrates
warned us50). And because writing relies on a system that can be
experienced in common, it becomes a sensible embodiment of truth.
Building on Husserls phenomenology, this Article suggests that
truthfulness stems from open accessibility. It would correct the current situation, which ironically encourages a hierarchical approach
to truth. Because the more sedimented through a particular technological mediation truth finds itself, the less open its meaning is
to refutations. Incorporating Husserls revised phenomenology
absent its ahistorical transcendental aspectthe semiotic agent is
44. See generally id.
45. Woelert, supra note 41, at 299 (quoting Edmund Husserl, The Origin of Geometry, in
THE CRISIS OF EUROPEAN SCIENCES AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY 353, 362 (David Carr ed., 1970) (1939) [hereinafter The Origin of Geometry]).
46. Id. (quoting EDMUND HUSSERL, THE CRISIS OF EUROPEAN SCIENCES AND
TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY 26 (David Carr ed., 1970) (1954)).
47. Id. (quoting The Origin of Geometry, supra note 45, at 361).
48. Id.
49. ZUIDERVAART, supra note 37, at 20.
50. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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free to inquire about the value of knowledge. Technological expertise is not a prerequisite to truth-establishing. It only frames the
beginning of the thought process. Only reflective, inquisitive thinking can guide the factfinder searching for truth. In the legal realm,
this inquisitiveness rests with the evidentiary rules of the legal process.
2.

Martin Heideggers Assertive View of Truth51

In 1954 German philosopher Martin Heidegger developed his
own phenomenological quest for the meaning of technology. He
questioned the essence of technology in the essay entitled: The
Question Concerning Technology.52 Heidegger essentially told his
audience that questioning builds a way [of being].53
The way is one of thinking. All the ways of thinking, more
or less perceptibly, lead through language in a manner
that is extraordinary. We shall be questioning concerning
technology, and in so doing we should like to prepare a free
relationship to it. The relationship would be free if it opens
our human existence to the essence of technology. When
we can respond to this essence, we should be able to experience the technological within its own bounds.54
Heidegger rejected Husserls phenomenology as the beginning of
a thought.55 Though, Heidegger embraces temporality of thought,
and its historicity. Thus, in terms of the phenomenology of technology, Heidegger moves its role to that of intermediary, enabling disclosedness (Erschlossenheit) and discoveredness (Entdecktheit) of
51. The conception of truth proposed by Martin Heideggers Being and Time is both
provocative and problematic. On the one hand, in going beyond Husserls phenomenological account, Heidegger provides a way to reconnect technical accounts of propositional truth within logic, epistemology, and philosophy of language with the cultural
practices and social institutions from which such accounts take distance. He does so
by developing an ontological alternative to a pervasive logical prejudice in Western
philosophy, an alternative to the propositionally inflected character of many conceptions of truth. On the other hand, Heidegger takes such a dim view of everydayness
and public communication that attaining truth becomes the inexplicable privilege of
authentic existence. This privileging of authentic existence ensnares his conception
in the self-referential incoherence of theorizing what, according to his own theory, cannot be theorized.
LAMBERT ZUIDERVAART, TRUTH IN HUSSERL, HEIDEGGER, AND THE FRANKFURT SCHOOL:
CRITICAL RETRIEVAL 47 (2017).
52. MARTIN HEIDEGGER, THE QUESTION CONCERNING TECHNOLOGY AND OTHER ESSAYS
(William Lovitt trans., 1977) (1954).
53. Id. at 3.
54. Id. at 34.
55. See generally id.
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meaning.56
French philosopher Bernard Stiegler discussed
Heideggers assessment of technology.57 Similarly to Heidegger,
Stiegler pointed out the intermediary role of technology between
the contingent and the accidental.58 Stiegler seems to have continued Heideggers view of technology as the unconceale[r]59 and revealer of the truth.60 Whether it is through language or writing,
technology intermediates thought61 and asserts truth.
Like Aristotle, Heidegger distinguished between knowledge and
technology:
Techné . . . . reveals whatever does not bring itself forth
and does not yet lie here before us . . . . Thus what is decisive in techné does not at all lie in making and manipulating nor in the using of means, but rather in the . . . revealing. It is as revealing, and not as manufacturing, that
techné is a bringing-forth . . . . Technology is a mode of revealing. Technology comes to presence . . . in the realm
where revealing and unconcealments take place, where
alétheia, truth, happens.62
Heidegger seems to promote the view about technology as enabling a way of thinking, a mode of revealing.63 Professor Paul Callister believes that, for Heidegger, technology enabled a non-reflective way of thinking.64 I think, for Heidegger, technology enabled
all thinkingreflective and computationaltechnology could reveal and conceal the truth. Heidegger noted that in light of the undeniable advances in science and technology, the possibility of
abandoning reflective thinking in the name of computational technology was moving from a mere possibility enabled by technology to
reality. But the result is not inevitable, because the essence of
technology is by no means anything technological65 It is in fact
thinking. The essence of technology is the reflective thinking it
56. ZUIDERVAART, supra note 37, at 48 (meaning can be both discerned and understood).
57. See generally ROSS ABBINNETT, THE THOUGHT OF BERNARD STIEGLER: CAPITALISM,
TECHNOLOGY AND THE POLITICS OF SPIRIT (2018).
58. Id. at 23.
59. MARK WRATHALL, HEIDEGGER AND UNCONCEALMENT: TRUTH, LANGUAGE, AND
HISTORY 30 (2011).
60. Bernard Stiegler, Philosophy and Technics, in PHILOSOPHISING BY ACCIDENT:
INTERVIEWS WITH ELIE DURING, 29, 42 (2017).
61. HEIDEGGER, supra, note 52.
62. Id. at 13 (emphasis in original).
63. Id. at xxv.
64. See Paul D. Callister, Law and Heideggers Question Concerning Technology: Prolegomenon to Future Law Librarianship, 99 L. LIBR. J. 285, 285 (2007).
65. HEIDEGGER, supra note 52, at 4.
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engenders (not endangers!) and then, asserts. In the legal realm, it
cannot happen automatically, it requires us to abandon the determinist view of technology.66
3.

A Jurisprudential Phenomenological View of Technology
as Actuating Possibility

This Article proposes a phenomenological view of technology as
potentially revealing the truth. It incorporates both Husserl and
Heideggers experiential approach. Technology sets up the beginning of a thought, mediating its possibility into actuality, asserting
its disclosedness.
For instance, consider the example of writing. A pen and paper
induce a type of reflectiveness, even before the process of thinking
starts. Given that it is harder to correct what is on the paper than
what is simply enunciated, one is perhaps more careful to engage
in the written text. Similarly, using a word processor sets up a particular cut-and-paste liberation which induces a particular thoughtcreation. Moreover, dictating software sets up an even more relaxed way of thinking. None of them can guarantee the quality of
the written text. Without more, there is no certainty of knowledge,
only its possibility, only the means to assert its actuation.
Technology is an intermediary prosthetic device of unlimited imaginative power. It threatens to replace decision-making reflective
processes with automated, computing thinking, because of its versatility. Technology is behind both calculative and reflective thinking: it conditions both. Technology is one of the most inventive vessels of truth whose meaning and legal role has not yet been established.
The signs of confusion about the role of technology appeared from
its Greek origins. As Plato reminds us, Socrates complained about
writing, because immortalizing events was also a way of creating
them.67 Through Socrates, Plato worried that humans write, like
God, to create. But unlike God, they also wrote to easily forget.
Forget what? That creation is hard? Perhaps, because recording
thoughts reproduces them. So, could it thus be that memorializing
frees us from the burden of inquiring about any other version of the
truth? Marshal McLuhan attempted to solve the problem with
technology by deciding in favor of determinism: the medium was

66. It is beyond the scope of this Article to investigate the attraction determinism and
computational thinking has over human nature.
67. PHAEDRUS, supra note 11.
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the message.68 But the challenge remains not to reduce technology
from potentiality to some frozen determinism but to embrace its
complexity while being aware of our interpretive limitations as semiotic agents. Technology can both reveal and obscure the truth, if
abandoned to technicality. Legally, such uniformity of application,
as writing or any recording device enables, would close all democratic avenues toward change. Technology advances through reflective thinking, which often has computational components. Its legal
applications are equally dual-natured.
II.

TECHNOLOGY AND LEGAL TRUTH-MAKING

Legally, evidentiary rules tell us that truth is what can be proven.
Rules of Evidence (the Rules) have embraced the so-called modern technologies which are expected to avoid deception. The mere
fact that we can talk about avoiding deception69 is itself deterministic and deceptive. But the Rules also reflect something essential
in their imperfection: they are not meant to solve anything alone.
As the late Eastern District of New York Senior Judge Jack Weinstein said:
The problems of expert witnesses are subtle and difficult.
They do not respond readily to simple solutions. I have
only two related points to make. First, we should not be
quick to abandon the principle of easy admissibility of expert and other testimony embodied in the Federal Rules of
Evidence. The Rules were designed to depend primarily
upon lawyer-adversaries and sensible triers of fact to evaluate conflicts.70
Technology is not meant to legally solve anything without the
trier of fact. Technology is more and more incorporated in the legal
realm because all facets of human life are more and more technology-driven. But that is the opposite of ready-made technical solutions. For technology to exist, reflective thinking is a prerequisite
both at the beginning and end process. Simplistic substitutes cannot but produce simplistic solutions.

68. See generally MARSHALL MCLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: THE EXTENSIONS OF
MAN 721 (1964).
69. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 206.2 (8th ed. 2020).
70. Jack B. Weinstein, Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence Is Sound; It Should Not
Be Amended, 138 F.R.D. 631, 631 (1991).
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Technology and Evidentiary Truth

Under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, a trial judge
must ensure that any scientific testimony or evidence admitted is
not only relevant but reliable.71 The Federal Rules of Evidence also
clarify the meaning of the term scientific.72 Moreover, Rule 702
also states that scientific testimony is appropriate when the judge
determines that the trier fact, the truth-finder, would benefit from
an intermediary, because the matter requires specialized
knowledge.73 The term knowledge within the meaning of Rule 702
connotes more than subjective belief or unsupported speculation.
In other words, technology is needed only as an intermediary to
guide the meaning-making process of the trier of fact. This is not a
rule about technology as truth-maker but as truth-enabler. Specialized knowledge is welcome if it mediates understanding for the
factfinder.
Historically, federal trial courts analyses and determinations
about the admissibility of scientific evidence were straightforward
and simple. For most of the twentieth century, from 192374 until
1993,75 the admissibility standard for scientific expert evidence at
trial was the so-called Frye test. This test obtained its name from
Frye v. United States.76 The issue in Frye was whether truth could
be viewed as spontaneous, coming without conscious effort, and
thus, reflected in blood pressure.77 The technique used to support
that theory was the systolic blood pressure test. The technique was
rejected (and therefore the admissibility test formulated), because
the Court found that the proposed systolic technique had not been
generally accepted in the relevant scientific fields.78 The implication
of that requirement for general acceptance in the relevant field was
crucial because technology was viewed in a determinist manner, being applied and used uniformly in every situation. Consequently,
the truthful value of the knowledge was conferred by the uniform
manner of obtaining that knowledge, although its result could have
been unintelligible to the factfinder.
But, as Judge Weinstein noted, technology is not the determinist
savior as its proponents would like it to be. Its results are
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993); see FED. R. EVID. 702(d).
See FED. R. EVID. 702(a)(c).
FED. R. EVID. 702(a).
Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 585.
Frye, 293 F. at 1013.
Id. at 1014.
Id.
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intimidating because they come from scientific experts and are difficult to evaluate by those without scientific expertise. Thus, Weinstein properly asked not for uniform applicability of tests, etc., but
for supervised application, for intermediated use:
Expert evidence can be both powerful and quite misleading
because of the difficulty in evaluating it. Because of this
risk . . . [t]he judge may insist, for example, on strong guarantees that tests relied on by an expert were properly conducted since a careless laboratory is a terrible hazard to
justice.79
In 1993, another change occurred in the way federal courts determined legal truth. In the case Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,80 the United States Supreme Court considered the technological role of epidemiological studies and whether those studies were
adequately reliable to support expert opinion evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 703.81 Unlike in Frye, in Daubert, the judiciary did not state that the admissibility standard depended on the
generally accepted technology in the field. It replaced general acceptance in the field with the trial judges view. The Daubert test
allows the trial judge to determine whether a witnesss testimony
is based on scientifically valid reasoning.82 Accordingly, the trial
judge became the ultimate arbiter of whether technology, in the
form of scientific testimony, is admissible for consideration by a
factfinder. When technology is admissible through the Daubert
framework, it is admitted as a result of reflective thinking by the
trial judge. This is a more nuanced view of technology, but still
deterministic: if the judge accepted the scientific and technological
evidence, its truth-worthiness benefited from the same aura as under the Frye test.
The Daubert Court represented welcome progress in fracturing
the monolithic deterministic view of technology. The Court noted
the critical concern under Rule 702 regarding whether or not a theory or method constituted the power bestowed on scientific
knowledge83 with evidentiary reliability84 or trustworthiness.85
Since 1993, trustworthiness has not depended on the general
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Weinstein, supra note 70, at 632.
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 579.
Id. at 584.
Id. at 59293.
509 U.S. at 590.
Id.
Id.
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acceptance86 by the scientific community, a rarefied, inaccessible
community, but on its relevance to the case, as explained to all by
the trial judge.
This is welcome progress because technology, when used in the
legal realm, has democratic ramifications. Whether openness and
understanding are valued socially, or whether reflective thinking is
abandoned in favor of a few technocrats matters. If a democratic
rule of law requires a uniform applicability of all legal norms in
force at that moment, it has no such requirement of how technology
is used. Law applies uniformly to induce trust. A blind, mechanical
approach to technology would produce, ironically, the opposite effect, especially if what is deemed scientific is not easily understandable by the factfinder. Technology is and needs to remain an artifact that mediates reflective thinking, which requires time and patience. This is the opposite of what laypeople and fact-finders are
told and encouraged to expect from technology. Or, in the words of
French poststructuralist Paul Virilio, what is expected from technologyimmediate uniform resultsis mere deception.87 That expectation itself is mere pretense and deceit: so much thinking goes
into every technical innovation, that to expect to master and understand its results without effort, is pure deception. Technology has
the potential to engage humans both in truth-inducing or
knowledge-provoking experiences, as well as in deceiving expediency. It is up to us how we want to use it.
B.

Legal Truth. A Phenomenological Perspective

To the extent that meaning is as much recognition as it is experience and sense-giving or meaning bestowal, philosophers have
been trapped in various schools of transcendentalism or ahistoricism.88 In law, truth relies on evidence, which is already a phenomenological shortcut, a reduction of meaning. If technology were to
replace the human element, its subjectivity, and the need for stratification, then what remains is an empty shell, a procedural requirement.
Husserl recognized this potential problem with technology, as
technique enabling decontextualization. He was aware of schematic descriptions of a wide range of processes, in rigid abstraction
from concrete referents and situations.
For Husserl, such
86. Id. at 58990 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 702).
87. PAUL VIRILIO, WAR AND CINEMA: THE LOGISTICS OF PERCEPTION (Patrick Camiller,
trans., Verso 1989) (1984). .
88. See discussion supra Part I, Section 3(i) (discussing Husserl).
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formalization would change how one operated rationally thinking,
producing something in general which can be constructed in pure
thought and in empty, formal generality.
Husserls concept of technization designates a transformation of the practice of rational thinking as a result of
which this thinking, along with the increasing reliance on
formal methods, becomes more efficient and effortless.
This, Husserl notes, is to the point that rational thought
itself becomes a sort of technique, namely, a calculating
technique. It is however precisely this cognitively alleviating process of technization that entails for Husserl that
thoughttechnized rational thoughttends to become
somewhat mechanical and forgetful, and thus ultimately .
. . more thoughtless.89
Legally, this layered approach to meaning intermediated by the
artifact, writing, is very suggestive of the role of technology proposed here. Jurisprudentially speaking, writing is the embodiment
of truth regarding contracts, for instance. If there is no written contract, then there is no contract. This is perhaps the most dramatic,
and the most expedient example of reality-making technology.
As noted in Williston on Contracts,90 originally, at common law,
a contract in writing had the same evidentiary value as a parole
contract: they both needed to be proven truthful in case of doubt.
But then, with the advent of capitalismand consequently the need
for expediencythe well-known statute of frauds was enacted by
the English Parliament in the second half of the seventeenth century. Under the guise that it provided defense against fraudulent
testimony, the statute of frauds provided that a party producing a
writing evidencing a contract was presumed to have proven the
truth. There was no inquiry into the ability of the opposing party
to know how to read or write. Moreover, as summarized in a 1991
Connecticut caseC.R. Klewin, Inc. v. Flagship Properties, Inc.91
the Statute of Frauds as an evidentiary provision denied jurors the
ability to participate as factfinders in the process of truth-finding.
Indeed, it seems that jurors tended to avoid the evidence in favor of
their own knowledge, which again, explains the attraction of the

89. See Woelert, supra note 41, at 301 (emphasis in original).
90. 9 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 21:1, Purpose and History of the Statute of Frauds (4th
ed. 2021).
91. C.R. Klewin, Inc. v. Flagship Props., Inc., 600 A.2d 772, 775 (Conn. 1991).
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determinist view of technologyas producing irrefutable truth, the
parties contractual will, in this instance.
The Connecticut statute of frauds has its origins in a 1677
English statute entitled An Act for the Prevention of
Fraud and Perjuries. The statute appears to have been
enacted in response to developments in the common law
[when] perjury and the subornation of perjury became a
widespread and serious problem. Furthermore, because
juries at that time decided cases on their own personal
knowledge of the facts, rather than on the evidence introduced at trial, a requirement, in specified transactions, of
some memorandum or note . . . in writing, and signed by
the party to be charged placed a limitation on the uncontrolled discretion of the jury.92
It is hard to refute the evidentiary value of such a rule, in light of
the problems it faced and solved. By the same token, it is difficult
not to worry about its future legal impact, especially if by chance,
technology is given another truth-making role hard to contest.
Today, when artificial intelligence (AI) defines the parameters
of scientific thinking, calculative-technological thinking produces
symbolism, measurable and calculative signs to decipher the mystery of life. It is taxing to engage in reflective thinking challenging
such advanced products. Heidegger was among the first to deplore
the potential loss of meditative contemplative thinking that the advent of technology encouraged. Heideggers worry came when AI
had not made its presence center stage.93 Each human transforms
into a cyborg-type being that becomes one with a digital smart
92. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (Although the British Parliament repealed
most provisions of the statute, including the one-year provision, in 1954 . . . the statute nonetheless remains the law virtually everywhere in the United States.).
93. Rauno Huttunen & Leena Kakkori, Heideggers Critique of the Technology and the
Educational Ecological Imperative, EDUC. PHIL. & THEORY, Mar. 2021, at 4,
https://doi.org/10.1080/00131857.2021.1903436. Huttunen and Kakkori explained:
When Heidegger writes about technology, modern technology, and machine technology, he mainly refers to the technology of the Second Industrial Revolution. When he
addresses the dangers of nuclear power and gene technology, these phenomena belong
to the era that we could call the Third Industrial Revolution. The Third Industrial
Revolution began in the late 20th century, with the rise of microelectronics and microcomputers. It continues nowadays with globalisation, robotisation, digitalisation, the
Internet, gene technology, hybrid warfare, immaterialisation of the production process,
nanotechnology, quantum computers, and cognitive capitalism. Following the lead of
Klaus Schwab, we could call this newly emerging era the Fourth Industrial Revolution.
Within the Fourth Industrial Revolution, human behaviour integrates with digital
equipment and becomes part of the global Internet of things.
Id. (citations omitted).
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device. These devices are already integrated with human thinking
and action.94
But, as Judge Weinstein noted, reflective thinking is the only way
to ensure that legal truth is more than the evidence meeting the
standards of various evidentiary rules. It reflects the facts in dispute in each particular case. This is a very hard precept to follow,
especially when technology has created an expectation of expedience and an uncritical subordination to its results.
C.

DNA Sample Collection as Irrefutable Evidence Fingerprinting for the 21st Century

Technological determinism has been and remains a problem in
the legal realm. More than a transcendental desire to find meaning, it reflects a transcendental desire to believe in easy ways out.
Reality does not necessarily support this trust, and Daubert has
chipped away at technological determinism with clear empowerment of the trial judge. Still, technological determinism continues
its sway in many areas of the legal realm to nefarious democratic
consequences for the rule of law and the trust it demands in its
reign. Ironically, too often, the more recent the technology, and
thus the less tested, the more trusted its application is, as shown
here.
For instance, twenty-five years ago, DNA technology was the
most advanced technology helping to exonerate individuals wrongfully convicted of rape and homicide to prove their innocence.95 Janet Reno, then the United States Attorney General, requested that
the National Institute of Justice establish a national commission to
examine the future of DNA evidence.96 Perhaps excited by its potential, the Commission examined issues that reached beyond the
Attorney Generals original questions about its exonerator role. It
examined postconviction DNA application to ensure a more effective integration of the technology into the criminal justice system.97
In the following years, the criminal justice system quickly created
vast DNA sample collections. At a news conference, the Attorney
General for the George W. Bush administration, John Ashcroft,
said:
94. Id.
95. See generally EDWARD CONNORS ET AL., CONVICTED BY JURIES, EXONERATED BY
SCIENCE: CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH INNOCENCE AFTER
TRIAL (U.S. Dept Just. ed., 1996).
96. Id. at iiiiv.
97. Christopher H. Asplen, Integrating DNA Technology into the Criminal Justice System, 83 JUDICATURE 144, 14446 (1999).
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The murder conviction of Alvin Braziel is a powerful example of how one technologyforensic DNA analysishas
revolutionized law enforcement. Over the short span of 10
years, DNA technology has proven itself to be the truth
machine of law enforcement, ensuring justice by identifying the guilty and exonerating the innocent.
With the strong support of Congress, the Department of Justice
has served as a leader in the national effort to maximize the benefits of DNA evidence, and the past five years have seen a national
explosion in forensic DNA collection. All fifty states and the federal
government now have laws on the books that require DNA to be
collected from convicted offenders for the purpose of criminal DNA
databasing.98
The reason for the trend toward broad DNA sample collection,
however, was surprisingly not based in science. As Ashcroft
boasted, the reason was simply experience.99 But not experience
in terms of time lapsed innovating and applying science and technology. It was the experience of wishful thinking (ignorantly)
transformed in proof, as the future tense Ashcroft used denotes:
[A]nd the reason is simple: Experience has taught law enforcement that the more offenders that are included in the
database, the more crimes will be solved.100
Technological determinism won the day, though the hawkish,
pro-war, and law and order political ideology of the Bush Administration might have helped this trend, too.101 The result was
expansive legislative efforts that violated individual human rights.
Indeed, the Combined DNA Index System, 34 U.S.C. § 40702, and
numerous state statutes enabled the collection of DNA samples. It
built on collections methods already approved by the U.S. Supreme
Court as minimal bodily invasion, and thus constitutional.102 However, the human rights violation was two-fold, the invasion to collect the sample and then its unlimited preservation. Taking a blood

98. John Ashcroft, U.S. Atty Gen., News Conference, DNA Initiative (Mar. 4, 2002)
(transcript available at http://www.justice.gov/archive/ag/speeches/2002/030402newsconferncednainitiative.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2021)).
99. Id.
100. Ashcroft, supra note 98 (emphasis added).
101. See generally Andrew Newman, Arms Control, Proliferation and Terrorism: The Bush
Administrations Post-September 11 Security Strategy, J. STRATEGIC STUD. 59 (2004) (highlighting the ideology that propped the Bush Presidency and its hawkish administration).
102. Skinner v. Ry. Lab. Execs. Assn, 489 U.S. 602, 625 (1989).
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sample was viewed as minimal and its potential benefit immense:
exculpating the wrongly convicted.103
Again, the results proved the opposite of what common sense
thinking would expect from novel uses of advanced technology. The
adoption of so many invasive statutes for unproven results, is democratically troublesome. The judiciary and legislative bodies chose
to endorse computational thinking at the expense of reflective
thinking. But, reflective thinking needs to support the automatic
decisions about the data collected indefinitely, even when that collection happens only in a relatively non-invasive manner. Violating
privacy for wishful thinking seems unwarranted in a liberal democracy.
Even worse, taking DNA from a lot of arrestees slows the
testing in active criminal investigations. After all, 12 million or more people are arrested each year. (According to
one study, by age 23, nearly one-third of Americans have
been arrested for an offense, not including minor traffic violations.) Backlogs created by arrestee DNA sampling
means that rape kits and samples from convicted offenders
sit in storage or go untested. This hurts innocent suspects
. . . because of a delay in testing evidence that later cleared
[them].104
Mindless use of technology does not exculpate anyone. This use
of technology has the disadvantage of minimizing the role of technology as instrumental in reflective thinking, which is the mark of
truth-finding. There is no societal value in increasing the role of
103. The constitutional discussion about the legality of taking and persevering blood and
DNA samples continues. For a concise explanation, see, e.g., Theodore F. Claypoole, Why We
Are Losing Our DNA Privacy Rights and What Legislators Can Do to Save Them, NATL L.
REV. (Jan. 30, 2020), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/why-we-are-losing-our-dna-privacy-rights-and-what-legislators-can-do-to-save-them.
104. Brandon L. Garrett & Erin Murphy, Supreme Court 2013: Why Collecting DNA from
People Who are Arrested Wont Help Solve More Crimes, SLATE, http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2013/02/dna_collection_at_the_supreme_court_maryland_v_king.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2021) (emphasis in original).
Research shows that bigger is only better if DNA databases grow in the right way: by
entering more samples from crime scenes, not samples from arrestees. DNA databases
already include 10 million-plus known offender profiles. But a database with every
offender in the nation cannot solve a crime if no physical evidence was collected or
tested. And police collect far too few such samples. [As of 2013, nationwide,] [p]olice
do routinely collect physical evidence in cases of homicide and in most cases of rape.
But evidence is not collected from eight out of 10 crime scenes for other serious offenses, like burglary, robbery, and aggravated assault. Forget what you see on the
proliferation of CSI spinoffs. Many jurisdictions do not even have dedicated and
trained crime scene investigators.
Id.; WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 3 SEARCH & SEIZURE § 5.4(c) (6th ed. 2020).
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technology as truth-making, by eliminating any other path to truthfinding. Technology as truth-making rather than truth-finding is
dangerous in a democratic society. Abandoning doubt, technology
reigns in violation of fundamental individual rights. For instance,
given the legislators analogy to fingerprinting, once DNA is identified, no individual can reclaim their undeniable identity. In 2005,
United States Senator Jon Kyl endorsed the DNA Fingerprint Act,
noting that no such expungement procedure exists for an arrestees
fingerprintsan arrestee who is ultimately not convicted has no
way to affirmatively seek the destruction of her fingerprint records.105 That procedure is equally missing in the case of DNA identification.
A decade after its implementation, in 2009, the National Research Council (NRC) of the National Academies of Science released its report, Strengthening Forensic Science in the United
States: A Path Forward.106 That report included harsh critiques of
many traditional forensic science techniques, including microscopic
hair analysis, forensic odontology, and questioned document examination.107
In evaluating the accuracy of a forensic analysis, it is crucial to clarify the type of question the analysis is called on
to address . . . . For example, microscopic hair analysis may
provide reliable evidence on some characteristics of the individual from which the specimen was taken, but it may
not be able to reliably match the specimen with a specific
individual.108
As in the case of all analyses leading to classification conclusions
(e.g., diagnostic tests in medicine), the microscopic hair analysis
process must be subjected to performance and validation studies in
which appropriate error rates can be defined and estimated.109
In sharp contrast, the report found that some techniques have
been thoroughly validated. For example, the report singled out nuclear DNA testing as the one forensic identification technique

105. See generally 151 CONG. REC. S13,756 (daily ed. Dec. 16, 2005) (statement of Sen.
Kyl); see also Anselm Franke & Eyal Weizman, FORENSIS: THE ARCHITECTURE OF PUBLIC
TRUTH (Forensics Architecture ed., Sternberg Press 2014); Garrett & Murphy, supra note
104.
106. See NATL RSCH. COUNCIL OF THE NATL ACADS., STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE
IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD (2009).
107. Id. at 127, 160, 166.
108. Id. at 8 (emphasis added).
109. Id. at 118 (emphasis added).
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demonstrated to consistently achieve accurate results with a high
degree of confidence.110
Perhaps the most appropriate words of warning are those of the
late Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, in his dissent in Maryland v. King.111 He raised concerns about the use of DNA samples
to create a ready-to-use database. Every time a crime occurs, society may choose to solve it relying on technology rather than on other
evidentiary means of proving the facts. But then, society might also
choose to prevent crime through public and private technological
surveillance, at the expense of its citizens privacy. Is it worth it?
The Courts assertion that DNA is being taken, not to solve crimes,
but to identify those in the States custody, taxes the credulity of the
credulous.112
Paraphrasing Justice Scalia, using technology and science to
avoid thinking is appositional to the very essence of science and
technology. Their progress requires reflective, time-consuming
thinking. Furthermore, our democracy demands an open, transparent approach to what is considered truth in the legal realm.
CONCLUSION  FOR A PHENOMENOLOGICAL USE OF TECHNOLOGY
IN THE LEGAL REALM
This Article argues in favor of technology as poiésis,113 as a chalice that frames and reveals the truth, or even the appearance of
truth mediated by evidentiary rules. It exposes the problems of relying on technology in its computational rather than its prosthetic,
supportive role of encouraging reflection over what constitutes
truth.
When technology is hailed as a mythical truth-provider, the participants to the legal process need to remember that the process by
which legal facts are constructed is significantly different than the
process of belief formation within an individual mind. Most notably, as James R. Steiner-Dillon noted recently, the factfinder relies
on the adversarial model of adjudication, which gives substantial
autonomy to the parties counsel to control what is presented as
(truth) evidence.114

110. Id. at 128.
111. Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 466 (2013) (Scalia, J. dissenting).
112. Id. (emphasis in original).
113. See generally HEIDEGGER, supra note 52; see also Blitz, supra note 3, at 76 (defining
poiésis as art, revealing beauty)
114. James R. Steiner-Dillon, Is Truth Truth?, 109 KY. L.J. 477, 48182 (2020).
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At the same time, the Rules of Evidence and other exclusionary rules prevent the parties from presenting certain
kinds of relevant evidence to the factfinder, and sometimes
prescribe the specific inferences that the factfinder may or
may not draw from the information it does receive. In addition, facts determined by a court, unlike those of an individual mind, are held to an explicit, ex ante standard of
proofa standard that shifts to reflect policy priorities external to the epistemic task. These distinctions, and others, are generally overlooked when we speak casually of
legally constructed facts as true or false.115
This Article advocates for technology to remain only a welcome
device in negotiating the appearance of truth as decided by the trial
judge on a case-by-case basis. In the legal realm, where truth is as
much as factual as evidentiary, the myth of finding it should remain
as important as other legal values of our democratic system, not the
least of which is ones human right to preserve privacy while living
in a democratic society whose rules are uniformly applied to all in
a manner open to a common understanding.

115. Id.

